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Abstract
“Social Choice: Recent Developments”
Walter Bossert and John A. Weymark
In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice
theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered
in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of
the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which eco-
nomic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic
domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic
models of resource allocation.
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1. Introduction
With the exception of the research on single-peaked preferences and their multidimen-
sional generalizations, for the most part, the early literature on social choice theory dealt
with abstract sets of alternatives and domains of preferences and feasible sets that ex-
hibited little structure. In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of
focus, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains coming to the fore. In
particular, a great deal of attention has been directed towards the kinds of concrete prob-
lems that arise in economics, with alternatives being allocations of goods and preferences
and feasible sets satisfying the kinds of restrictions encountered in economic models. In
this article, we provide an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in
normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role:
Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice,
strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation. Structured
environments have also been considered in positive social choice theory, notably in the
political economy literature. See Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) for an introduction
to this literature. Other areas of social choice theory have been active as well in recent
years. See Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura (2002, 2006) for recent surveys of these topics.
2. Arrovian social choice on economic domains
Arrow’s Theorem (see Arrow, 1963) is concerned with the aggregation of proﬁles of
individual preference orderings into a social ordering of a set of alternatives X. Let
R denote the set of all orderings of X. In Arrow’s Theorem, there is a ﬁnite set of
individuals N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2, each of whom has a weak preference ordering Ri
on X. An (Arrovian) social welfare function f assigns a social ordering R = f(R) of X
to each proﬁle R = (R1, . . . , Rn) of individual preference orderings in some domain D of
proﬁles. Arrow’s Theorem demonstrates that it is impossible for a social welfare function
to satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, henceforth IIA (the social ranking of a
pair of alternatives only depends on the individual rankings of these alternatives), Weak
Pareto (if everyone strictly prefers one alternative to a second, then so does society),
and Nondictatorship (nobody’s strict preferences are always respected) if the domain is
unrestricted (D = Rn) and |X| ≥ 3.
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Arrow’s Theorem is not directly applicable to economic problems. In economic prob-
lems, both the social alternatives and the individual preferences exhibit considerable
structure and, therefore, a social welfare function only needs to be deﬁned on a restricted
domain of preference proﬁles. For a comprehensive survey of the literature on Arrovian
social choice on economic domains, see Le Breton and Weymark (2006).
When X is a subset of the real line R, a preference Ri is single-peaked if there is a
unique best alternative π(Ri) in X, the peak, and alternatives on the same side of the
peak are worse the further away from the peak they are. Let S denote the set of all single-
peaked preferences on X. If the alternatives in X are diﬀerent levels of a single public
good, it is natural to expect individual preferences to be single-peaked. Black (1948) has
shown that ranking pairs of alternatives by majority rule produces a social ordering if
the individuals have single-peaked preferences when n is odd. More generally, it follows
from results in Moulin (1980) that on Sn, any generalized median social welfare function
satisﬁes all of the Arrow axioms except his domain assumption with Nondictatorship
strengthened to Anonymity (permuting preferences leaves the social ordering invariant).
These functions are deﬁned by ﬁrst ﬁxing single-peaked preferences for n − 1 phantom
voters and then applying majority rule to proﬁles consisting of the preferences of the n
real individuals and n− 1 phantoms. Note that the number of individuals, both real and
phantom, is odd, so Black’s Theorem applies. Recently, Ehlers and Storcken (2002) have
characterized all of the social welfare functions on this domain that satisfy IIA and Weak
Pareto.
A domain D of preference proﬁles is Arrow inconsistent if no social welfare function
satisfying Arrow’s three non-domain axioms exists on D. In a seminal article, Kalai,
Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) identiﬁed a suﬃcient condition for D to be Arrow
inconsistent when D is the Cartesian product of individual preference domains Di. A
set of alternatives is free if preference proﬁles are unrestricted on this set. A domain is
saturating if (i) there are at least two free pairs, (ii) any two free pairs of alternatives
can be connected to each other by means of a series of overlapping free triples, and (iii)
any other pair of alternatives is trivial in the sense that there is only one way in which
any individual ranks these alternatives. When each of the individual preference domains
Di is the same, saturating preference domains are Arrow inconsistent. Because a free
pair is part of a free triple when the domain is saturating, Arrow’s Theorem implies
that there is a dictator on this pair when IIA and Weak Pareto are satisﬁed. The same
person must be a dictator on all free pairs because adjacent free triples in the connection
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procedure have two alternatives in common. On trival pairs, by Weak Pareto, everyone
is a dictator. This method of showing that a domain is Arrow inconsistent is known as
the local approach.
Kalai, Muller, and Satterthwaite (1979) have also shown that when X = Rm+ , inter-
preted as the set of all allocations of m divisible public goods, the domain of all proﬁles of
classical public-goods preferences (i.e., continuous, monotonic, and convex preferences) is
saturating and, hence, is Arrow inconsistent when m ≥ 2. Other examples of saturating
domains include the set of all expected utility preferences on the set of lotteries on three
or more certain outcomes (Le Breton, 1986) and the set of Euclidean spatial preferences
on Rm+ or R
m; i.e., preferences for which there is a global best alternative and alternatives
are ranked by the negative of their distance from this alternative (Le Breton and Wey-
mark, 2002). The Arrow inconsistency of the spatial preference domain was originally
shown by Border (1984) using a diﬀerent proof strategy.
When alternatives are allocations of private goods and individuals only care about
their own consumption, Bordes and Le Breton (1989) have identiﬁed a strengthening of
the concept of a saturating domain that implies that the domain is Arrow inconsistent. If
X consists of all the allocations of two or more divisible private goods in which everyone
is guaranteed to receive a positive amount of some good, then the domain satisﬁes this
condition if individuals can have any classical private-goods preference; i.e., a preference
that is continuous, monotonic, ancd convex over own consumption. (Some of the results
concerning classical private-goods preferences discussed below require some additional
minor restrictions on preferences that are not stated explicitly here.) See also Maskin
(1976) and Border (1983).
The examples considered so far all have the feature that the set of alternatives has a
Cartesian structure. If X incorporates feasiblity constraints, this is not the case. Using a
modiﬁcation of the local approach, Bordes, Campbell, and Le Breton (1995) have shown
that the domain of classical private-goods preferences are Arrow inconsistent if the set of
alternatives is the set of feasible allocations with positive consumptions of all goods for
an exchange economy with two or more divisible private goods. Bordes and Le Breton
(1990) have also adapted the local approach to analyze Arrow consistency in assignment,
matching, and pairing problems. In an assignment problem, one of n indivisible objects
is assigned to each of the n individuals. In a matching problem, there are two groups of
n individuals with each person from one group matched to one person from the other
group. In a pairing problem, an even number n of individuals are grouped in pairs.
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If the preference domains in these problems are such that individuals only care about
which individual or good they are matched, paired, or assigned to, but are otherwise
unrestricted, then the domain is Arrow inconsistent when n ≥ 4.
The preceding discussion suggests that economic domain restrictions do not provide
a satisfactory way of circumventing Arrow’s social welfare function impossibility theo-
rem when the set of alternatives is not one-dimensional. This conclusion is reinforced
by the results in Redekop (1995) that show that in order for a subset of a domain of
Arrow-inconsistent economic preferences to be Arrow consistent, the subdomain must be
topologically small. Roughly speaking, this requirement severely limits the amount of
preference diversity that can be present in the domain.
Arrow’s Theorem can also be formulated in terms of a social choice correspondence.
For each preference proﬁle R in its preference domain D, a social choice correspondence
C speciﬁes the socially optimal alternatives C(A,R) in each agenda A (feasible subset
of X) in its agenda domain A. In its choice-theoretic formulation, the Arrow axioms are
Arrow’s Choice Axiom (for a ﬁxed preference proﬁle, if agenda A is a subset of agenda B,
then the alternatives chosen in A consists of the restriction to A of the set of alternatives
chosen from B when this restriction is nonempty), Independence of Infeasible Alternatives
(the alternatives chosen from an agenda only depend on the preferences for alternatives
in this agenda), Pareto Optimality (only Pareto optimal alternatives are chosen), and
Nondictatorship (the chosen alternatives are not always a subset of one individual’s best
feasible alternatives). Arrow’s Theorem shows that these conditions are inconsistent if
the preference domain is unrestricted and the agenda domain consists of all the ﬁnite
subsets of X. When the agenda domain is closed under ﬁnite unions (as is the case in
the choice-theoretic version of Arrow’s Theorem), Arrow’s Choice Axiom is necessary
and suﬃcient for the chosen alternatives in each admissible agenda to be generated by
maximizing a proﬁle-dependent social ordering of X (see Hansson, 1968).
In some economic applications, the ability to restrict the agenda domain, not just the
preference domain, has weakened the constraints on the admissible social choice corre-
spondences suﬃciently so that the Arrovian axioms are consistent. This observation was
ﬁrst made by Bailey (1979), who noted that the set of feasible allocations in an exchange
economy does not contain a ﬁnite number of alternatives, and so does not satisfy Arrow’s
agenda domain assumption. While the example Bailey used to show the consistency of
the Arrow axioms is problematic, as Donaldson and Weymark (1988) have shown, if each
agenda in the agenda domain is the set of feasible allocations for an exchange economy
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with divisible private goods (diﬀerent aggegate endowments yield diﬀerent agendas) and
the preference domain only includes classical private-goods preferences, then the Arrow
axioms are consistent. For example, the Equal-Division Walrasian social choice corre-
spondence satisﬁes these axioms. For each exchange economy, this correspondence selects
the set of Walrasian (competitive) equilibrium allocations using an equal division of the
aggregate endowment as each individual’s endowment vector.
When production is possible, an agenda is the set of feasible allocations given the
aggregate resource endowment and the production technologies. Possible restrictions
on agendas include compactness, comprehensiveness (i.e., they satisfy free disposal), and
convexity. When there are only public goods, Le Breton and Weymark (2002) have shown
that the Arrow axioms are consistent if the preference domain only includes Euclidean
spatial preferences on Rm+ with m ≥ 2 and the agenda domain only includes compact sets
with nonempty interiors. With these domain assumptions, a social choice correspondence
satisfying the Arrow axioms can be constructing by ﬁxing a utility representation for each
preference and then using an individualistic Bergson–Samuelson social welfare function
to choose the best alternatives from each agenda for each preference proﬁle.
In both of these examples, one of the Arrow axioms is vacuous. In the exchange
economy example, it is Arrow’s Choice Axiom, whereas in the spatial example, it is
Independence of Infeasible Alternatives. For a public goods economy with at least two
divisible goods, none of the Arrow axioms are vacuous if the agenda domain includes
only compact comprehensive sets with nonempty interiors and the preference domain
only includes classical public-goods preferences. By means of an example, Donaldson and
Weymark (1988) have shown that the Arrow axioms are consistent with these domain
assumptions. However, their example exhibits dictatorial features and it is not known if
the axioms are still consistent if Nondictatorship is replaced with Anonymity (permuting
preferences for a given agenda does not change the set of chosen alternatives). Donaldson
and Weymark have also established a private-goods version of this possibility theorem.
Arrovian impossibility results have also been obtained using the social choice cor-
respondence framework. For example, for public goods economies, Duggan (1996) has
shown that Arrow’s axioms are inconsistent if X = Rm+ with m ≥ 3, the agenda domain
consists of all the compact, comprehensive, and convex subsets of X, and the preference
domain is the set of all proﬁles of classical public-goods preferences.
Unlike with the local approach used to analyze social welfare functions, no unify-
ing methodology has been developed to investigate the consistency of Arrow’s choice-
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theoretic axioms, with the consequence that little is yet known about where the the
boundary between possibility and impossibility for social choice correspondences lies.
3. Variable-population social choice
The Arrovian framework is based on ordinal preferences that are interpersonally non-
comparable and, hence, any social decision rule that makes use of interpersonal utility
comparisons, such as classical utilitarianism, is ruled out from the outset. Sen (1974)
has argued that this informational poverty plays a fundamental role in precipitating Ar-
rovian impossibilities and has proposed a generalization of the concept of an Arrovian
social welfare function called a social welfare functional to allow for interpersonal utility
comparisons. Each individual i is assumed to have a utility function Ui on the set of
alternatives Xi in which he is alive and a social welfare functional maps each admissible
proﬁle of individual utility functions into a social ordering of the set of all alternatives X.
In ﬁxed-population social choice, Xi = X for all i. There is an extensive literature that
has investigated the implications for the functional form of these functionals of combin-
ing diﬀerent assumptions concerning the measurability and interpersonal comparability
of utility with various normative criteria, including analogues of the Arrovian axioms,
when there is a ﬁxed population. See Bossert and Weymark (2004) for a survey. In this
section, we provide an introduction to the main issues that arise in selecting appropriate
social objective functions when the population size is not ﬁxed. A detailed treatment
of this topic and further references may be found in Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson
(2005).
Population ethics has established itself as an important branch of moral philosophy
over the last three decades. Parﬁt (1984) has been particularly inﬂuential in bringing
this issue to the attention of philosophers and, more generally, to scholars in various
disciplines interested in applied ethics. An up-to-date account of variable-population is-
sues in moral philosophy is given by Broome (2004). Although there are many economic
applications of variable-population social choice, such as the design of aid packages to
developing countries that may have population consequences, the choice of budgets de-
voted to prenatal care, and policies aﬀecting the intergenerational allocation of resources,
the economics literature, with few exceptions, did not pay much attention to this topic
until recently. Much of the recent interest in these issues can be traced to the inﬂuential
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article by Blackorby and Donaldson (1984), who extended the welfarist model of social
choice to allow for a variable population.
In this setting, each alternative x ∈ X is a complete description of the relevant state
of aﬀairs including the size and composition of the population. Furthermore, alternatives
are interpreted as full histories of the world, from the remote past to the distant future.
Thus, the set of those alive in x contains everyone who has ever lived in this alternative
and not merely those who are alive in a given period. This assumption is important to
avoid counter-intuitive conclusions regarding the termination of lives. As a consequence,
ending someone’s life does not change population size; it aﬀects the lifetime and, possibly,
the lifetime utility of the person in question.
For each x ∈ X, ui = Ui(x) is the lifetime well-being (utility) of any individual i alive
in x and U(x) is the vector of utilities of these individuals. The standard convention is
to assign a lifetime-utility level of zero to a neutral life. A life, taken as a whole, is a
neutral life from the viewpoint of the individual leading it if it is as good as a life without
any experiences (a state of permanent unconsciousness). Note that it is not necessary to
invoke states of non-existence of an individual in order to deﬁne the notion of neutrality.
In particular, it is not claimed that an individual can gain or lose by being brought into
existence. Therefore, an existing person’s life is worth living if the individual’s lifetime
utility is positive.
Welfarism is the principle that the only features of an alternative that are socially
relevant are the utilities of the individuals alive in this alternative. Welfarism implies
that the social ordering of X for any proﬁle of individual utility functions in the domain
of the social welfare functional can be determined by a single social welfare ordering
of all possible vectors of individual utilities U = ∪n∈NRn. That is, if a social welfare
functional is welfarist, there exists an ordering R on U such that alternative x ∈ X is
at least as good as alternative y ∈ X for the proﬁle of utility functions U if and only if
U(x)RU(y). The set of individuals alive in x and y need not be the same. Thus, given
welfarism, the problem of variable-population social evaluation can be reduced to the
problem of establishing a social welfare ordering R on the set U of all utility vectors (of
varying dimension). If there are n ∈ N individuals alive in an alternative, without loss of
generality they can be labelled 1, . . . , n provided that the standard anonymity property
is satisﬁed. A representation of the restriction of R to ﬁxed-population comparisons is
an individualistic Bergson–Samuelson social welfare function.
The most commonly-discussed examples of variable-population social welfare order-
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ings are extensions of utilitarianism. According to average utilitarianism (AU) (resp.
classical utilitarianism (CU)), average (resp. total) utilities are used as the criterion
to compare any two utility vectors. Formally, for all n,m ∈ N, all u ∈ Rn, and all
v ∈ Rm, uRAUv if and only if 1n
∑n
i=1 ui ≥ 1m
∑m
i=1 vi (resp. uRCUv if and only if∑n
i=1 ui ≥
∑m
i=1 vi). Clearly, ﬁxed-population comparisons are the same according to
RAC and RCU, but this is not necessarily the case if n and m diﬀer.
Average utilitarianism is rejected by most contributors to this area. Its fundamental
problem is that the value of adding a person, ceteris paribus, depends on the utilities
of those alive. This has rather unfortunate consequences. Suppose, for example, that
everyone is extremely well-oﬀ in an alternative and we consider the addition of an in-
dividual who, if brought into existence, would have a lifetime utility just slightly below
the average of the existing population and no one else’s utility is aﬀected. According to
AU, this person should not be brought into existence. The dual of this example at the
other end of the spectrum can be considered even more disturbing. Consider a society in
which everyone is extremely miserable by all standards (and well below neutrality). AU
recommends the ceteris paribus addition of anyone with a lifetime utility slightly above
the average, even if this utility level is well below neutrality.
Classical utilitarianism suﬀers from what Parﬁt (1984) calls the repugnant conclusion.
A variable-population social welfare ordering R implies the repugnant conclusion if, for
any population size n, for any positive level of utility ξ (no matter how high), and for
any level of utility ε ∈ (0, ξ) (no matter how close to zero), there exists a population size
m > n such that a population with n people in which everyone has a lifetime utility of ξ
is considered inferior to a population of m individuals each of which has a lifetime utility
of ε. That is, for any situation in which everyone alive has an arbitrarily high level of
well-being, there is always a situation of mass poverty (with everyone arbitrarily close to
neutrality) that is considered superior.
In order to avoid the repugnant conclusion and, at the same time, the counter-intuitive
implications of average utilitarianism, Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) have proposed
critical-level utilitarianism (CLU) with a positive critical level as an alternative criterion.
CLU employs a parameter α ∈ R (the critical level) and is deﬁned by letting, for all
n,m ∈ N, all u ∈ Rn, and all v ∈ Rm, uRCLUv if and only if
∑n
i=1[ui − α] ≥
∑m
i=1[vi −
α]. The special case corresponding to α = 0 is CU. The parameter α has an intuitive
interpretation: it is the level of utility that, if experienced by an additional person, makes
the alternative resulting from the ceteris paribus addition of such a person to any given
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society as good as the original. Because the critical level is constant, the problems of
AU alluded to above are avoided. If, moreover, α is positive, the repugnant conclusion
is avoided because there is a positive diﬀerence between the critical level and the level of
utility representing neutrality.
In addition to providing a thorough analysis of critical-level utilitarianism and its
main alternatives, Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson (2005) have discussed several ex-
tensions of the basic model. For example, the critical-level utilitarian orderings can be
generalized by considering transformed utilities rather than the utilities themselves. If
the transformation is chosen to be strictly concave, the corresponding social ordering
represents inequality aversion in utilities. Furthermore, they have considered orderings
that use non-welfare information such as birth dates and lifetimes in addition to lifetime
utilities, as well as variants that incorporate uncertainty. Moreover, they have analyzed
variable-population choice problems and applications.
4. Strategy-proof social choice
A social choice function g chooses one alternative from the set of alternatives X for each
preference proﬁle in the domain D. If it is only known that the true proﬁle is in D, in
order to implement the desired choice g(R) when the proﬁle is R, individuals must have
an incentive to truthfully report their preferences. Strategy-proofness is the requirement
that nobody can can obtain a preferred outcome by reporting a false preference regardless
of what the preferences of the other individuals are. Strategy-proofness places severe
constraints on the kinds of social choice functions that can be considered and, on some
domains, conﬂicts with other social desiderata. For introductions to recent developments
in strategy-proof social choice theory, see Sprumont (1995) and Barbera` (2001).
The classic result on strategy-proofness is the Gibbard (1973)–Satterthwaite (1975)
Theorem, which shows that no social choice function g can satisfy both Nondictator-
ship and Pareto Optimality when D = Rn if |X| ≥ 3. The same conclusion follows if
Pareto Optimality is replaced with Unanimity, the requirement that an alternative is
chosen if everybody agrees that it is uniquely best. Either of these conditions imply
that the range rg(g) of g is all of X when the domain is unrestricted. A variant of the
Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem states that on an unrestricted domain, if |rg(g)| ≥ 3,
then strategy-proofness implies that someone must be a dictator on rg(g) (i.e., g always
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chooses one of this person’s best alternatives on rg(g)).
More positive results are obtained if it is known that preferences are single-peaked.
Moulin (1980) has shown that if X ⊆ R, D = Sn, and the social choice function g only
depends on the peaks of the individual preferences, then g satisﬁes Strategy-proofness
if and only if it is a minmax social choice function and it satisﬁes Strategy-proofness,
Pareto Optimality, and Anonymity if and only if it is a generalized median social choice
function. A minmax social choice function g is deﬁned by specifying an alternative xS
in the closure of X for each coalition of individuals with xT ≤ xS if S ⊆ T and setting
g(R) = min
S⊆N
{
max
i∈S
{π(Ri), xS}
}
, ∀R ∈ Sn.
For each R ∈ Sn, a generalized median social choice function chooses the median of the
actual individual preference peaks and the ﬁxed peaks of n − 1 phantom voters. These
functions are minmax rules in which the alternatives xS are the same for coalitions
of the same size. Barbera`, Gul, and Stacchetti (1993) have provided an alternative
characterization of minmax rules in terms of winning coalitions that has proved to be
quite useful. If, as is the case with minmax rules, the chosen alternative for each proﬁle
only depends on each person’s most-preferred alternative(s) on the range, the social
choice function satisﬁes the tops-only property. On the domain Sn, Barbera` and Jackson
(1994) have shown that the tops-only property assumed by Moulin (1980) is implied by
Strategy-proofness if either rg(g) is an interval or g satisﬁes Pareto Optimality.
The original strategies used to prove the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem cannot be
adopted to analyze strategy-proofness when preferences are continuous. The problem
is that these proofs alter proﬁles by moving two alternatives to the top two positions
in a person’s preference, but this is not possible with continuous preferences if X is a
connected set, as there can be no second-ranked alternative. This diﬃculty was overcome
by Barbera` and Peleg (1990) who established a version of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite
Theorem for continuous preferences on a metric space of alternatives using the option
set methodolgy introduced by Laﬀond (1980), Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981),
and Barbera` (1983). An option set identiﬁes the set of outcomes that are feasible given
the preferences of a subgroup of individuals for some admissible reported preferences
of the rest of the population. For example, when there is a dictator d, the option set
generated by Rd consists of the best alternatives on the range for this preference and the
option set generated by any other person’s preference is the whole range. The option
set methodology proceeds by identifying the structure imposed on option sets by the
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properties that one wants the social choice function to satisfy.
In order for a social choice function to be strategy-proof, it must ignore most of the
information about individual preferences. On many domains in which all admissible
preferences have unique best alternatives on the range, strategy-proofness implies the
tops-only property provided that the range of the social choice function satisﬁes some
regularity condition. Weymark (2004) has proposed a proof strategy for establishing the
tops-only property that avoids the model speciﬁcity of earlier proofs.
A social choice function deﬁned on a domain of proﬁles of separable preferences on
a product set of alternatives is decomposable if the value chosen for a component only
depends on the individual marginal preferences for that component. The ﬁrst decompos-
ability results were established by Border and Jordan (1983) who, for example, showed
that for the domain of all proﬁles of separable quadratic preferences on a multidimen-
sional Euclidean space, a social choice function satisﬁes Strategy-proofness and Unanim-
ity if and only if it decomposes into strategy-proof, unanimous social choice functions on
each component. Furthermore, these one-dimensional mechanisms can be any member
of Moulin’s class of minmax social choice functions. Since the development of the option
set methodology, decomposibility results for strategy-proof social choice functions have
been established for a number of other domains of separable preferences. For example,
Barbera`, Gul, and Stacchetti (1993) have shown that if X is a discrete product set in a
Euclidean space and individuals can have any separable peference that satisﬁes a multi-
dimensional analogue of single-peakedness, then the conclusions of Border and Jordan’s
theorem hold if the range of the social choice function is all of X. Whether Strategy-
proofness and auxiliary conditions such as Unanimity imply decomposability depends on
how much preference variability is present in the domain. Establishing a decomposabil-
ity theorem typically involves ﬁrst showing that the tops-only property is satisﬁed, as
in Barbera`, Gul, and Stacchetti (1993). Much of the literature on this issue has been
synthesized and extended by Le Breton and Sen (1995, 1999).
If X is a product set, but only a subset Z of X is feasible, decomposability results
are still possible, but not every combination of the corresponding one-dimensional social
choice functions is admissible. For example, using the model in Barbera`, Gul, and Stac-
chetti (1993) with the best alternative for each preference required to be in Z, Barbera`,
Masso´, and Neme (1997) have shown that any social choice function g that is strategy-
proof and whose range is Z is decomposable into one-dimensional minmax rules on each
component, but in order for a combination of such minmax rules to always produce a
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feasible outcome, g must satisfy a rather complicated condition called the intersection
property.
In the preceding discussion, everyone has the same set of admissible preferences, and
so it is possible that they might agree on what is best. When there are private goods and
individuals only care about their own consumption, one generally expects there to be
distributional conﬂicts. We illustrate the implications of strategy-proofness with private
goods in two problems: the allotment problem and the exchange of divisible goods.
In an allotment problem, there is a ﬁxed amount Ω of a divisible good to allocate.
If individuals only care about own consumption, each person’s preference is deﬁned on
X = [0,Ω]. If these preferences are single-peaked, a prominent solution to this problem is
the uniform rule (see Benassy, 1982) which, for each admissible proﬁle R ∈ Sn, chooses
the unique allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Xn (xi is person i’s allocation) for which (i) if
Ω ≤ ∑ni=1 π(Ri), there exists λ ∈ R+ such that, for all i ∈ N , xi = min{π(Ri), λ} and
(ii) if Ω ≥∑ni=1 π(Ri), there exists λ ∈ R+ such that, for all i ∈ N , xi = max{π(Ri), λ}.
Sprumont (1991) has shown that if the domain is the set of all proﬁles of continuous
single-peaked preferences on X, then a social choice function satisﬁes Strategy-proofness,
Pareto Optimality, and Private-Goods Anonymity (permuting preferences results in the
same permutation of the individual allocations) if and only if it is the uniform rule.
Sprumont’s article also includes the ﬁrst explicit theorem about the tops-only property
in the strategy-proofness literature.
When X is the set of allocations of an exchange economy with two or more divisible
private goods, the general conclusion is that Strategy-proofness and Pareto Optimality
conﬂict with other desirable properties for a social choice function on a suﬃciently rich
domain of classical private-goods preference proﬁles. If the aggregate endowment is pri-
vately owned and participation in the collective choice procedure is voluntary, the social
choice function must satisfy Individually Rationality; i.e., each person is guaranteed a
consumption bundle weakly preferred to his endowment. Hurwicz (1972) has shown that
Strategy-proofness, Pareto Optimality, and Individual Rationality are inconsistent for
two-person, two-good exchange economies on such a preference domain. This impossi-
bility theorem has only recently been extended to the general n-person, m-good case by
Serizawa (2002).
With monotonic preferences, a dictator in an exchange economy always receives the
whole endowment. For the domain of classic private-goods preference proﬁles, Zhou
(1991) has shown that Strategy-proofness, Pareto Optimality, and Nondictatorship are
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inconsistent when there are at least two goods, but only two individuals. When there are
at least three individuals, Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) have shown by example
how to construct Pareto optimal, strategy-proof, nondictatorial social choice functions
for this domain. In their example, someone is bossy (i.e., there is an individual who
can change the consumption bundle of someone else by reporting a diﬀerent preference
without aﬀecting his or her own consumption bundle) and, for each proﬁle, one of two
individuals receives all of the endowment. It is generally agreed that bossy mechanisms
are unsatisfactory. Serizawa and Weymark (2003) have shown that any social choice
function that satisﬁes Strategy-proofness and Pareto Optimality cannot guarantee ev-
eryone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin on a rich domain of classical
private-goods preferences.
Given that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal social choice function g must fail
even minimal distributional desiderata on such domains, Barbera` and Jackson (1995)
have explored the implications of abandoning Pareto Optimality. For private ownership
exchange economies with classical private-goods preferences, they have shown that if g is
strategy-proof, nonbossy, and satisﬁes some other auxiliary conditions, then trade must
be restricted to occur in a limited set of ﬁxed proportions with possibly upper limits on the
amounts that can be exchanged. In the case of two goods and two individuals, if g satisﬁes
Strategy-proofness and Individual Rationality, there are only two such proportions, and
the choice procedure resembles the ﬁxed-price trading rules studied by Benassy (1982)
with diﬀerent buying and selling prices for each good.
5. Axiomatic models of resource allocation
The recent literature on axiomatic models of resource allocation has a close aﬃnity to
the literature on Arrovian social choice on economic domains. As is the case with Ar-
rovian social choice when there are multiple agendas, the research on axiomatic models
of resource allocation investigates the implications of normative criteria (axioms) when
both individual preferences and the set of feasible agendas satisfy the kinds of restric-
tions found in economic models. What distinguishes this literature is the set of axioms
considered, many of which rely on the special structure provided by economic models for
their deﬁnition. In this section, we present a very selective introduction to the models
and axioms considered in this literature and describe a few of the theorems that have
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been obtained. For a comprehensive survey of this literature, see Thomson (2006).
In an allocation problem, there is an aggregate social endowment Ω ∈ Rm++ of m private
goods that are to be allocated among n ≥ 2 individuals based on their preferences. In
the canonical allocation problem, m ≥ 2 and all goods are divisible. An economy is then
described by a pair E = (R,Ω), where R is a proﬁle of classical private-goods preferences.
Let E denote the set of all such economies. Given the endowment Ω, the corresponding
agenda A(Ω) is the set of feasible allocations x = (x1, . . . , xn) that exhaust Ω, where
xi ∈ Rm+ is person i’s consumption bundle.
A solution is a mapping that selects a subset of the feasible allocations for each
economy in E . Note that a solution ϕ can be identiﬁed with a social choice correspondence
C by setting C(A(Ω),R) = ϕ(E) for all E ∈ E . A solution satisﬁes Eﬃciency if it always
chooses Pareto optimal allocations and it satisﬁes No Envy if, at any selected allocation,
nobody strictly prefers anyone else’s allocated consumption bundle. No Envy, which was
independently introduced by Tinbergen (1953), Foley (1967), and Kolm (1972), is the
fundamental fairness condition considered in this literature. An example of a solution
satisfying both Eﬃciency and No Envy for this class of economies is the Equal-Division
Walrasian solution ϕW, which is deﬁned from the Equal-Division Walrasian social choice
correspondence in the manner described above.
The recent literature on fair allocation has expanded the scope of the canonical model
in several respects. For example, economies with varying populations or with production
have been considered. In addition, variations of this model have been explored, for exam-
ple, by allowing for indivisibilities or, when there is only one good, preference restrictions
such as single-peakedness.
An alternative setup with public goods has also been examined. The existence of
solutions satisfying Eﬃciency and No Envy in public-goods environments is a more com-
plex matter than in the private-goods case, largely because arguments involving pure
exchange cannot be invoked when there are public goods. Furthermore, the technology
that permits us to transform private goods into public goods is also important. With
some additional assumptions, however, Eﬃciency and No Envy can be satisﬁed; see Dia-
mantaras (1991), for example.
Prominent among the new axioms that have been introduced and used in charac-
terizations of existing and new solutions is Consistency, which is discussed in detail in
Thomson (1990). In order to deﬁne Consistency, the notion of a solution must be ex-
tended to include economies with diﬀerent numbers of individuals. Let x be an allocation
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that is selected by such a solution for an (n+1)-person economy. Now suppose that per-
son k leaves the economy with the consumption xk. Deﬁne a reduced n-person economy
by removing k and subtracting xk from the total endowment. Consistency demands that
the allocation (x1, . . . , xk−1, xk+1, . . . , xn+1) is selected in the reduced economy.
Other important properties include monotonicity conditions with respect to the quan-
tities of the resources available, with respect to the technology, or with respect to the
population. A solution ϕ satisﬁes Resource Monotonicity if, whenever the social en-
dowment expands, no-one becomes worse oﬀ in any chosen allocation. In private-goods
models with production, an axiom similar in spirit to resource monotonicity is Technol-
ogy Monotonicity. It requires that if the only diﬀerence between two economies is that
the technology of one dominates that of the other, then everyone should be at least as
well-oﬀ in any allocation chosen for the former economy than in any allocation chosen for
the latter. Population Monotonicity is a solidarity axiom. As is the case for Consistency,
it applies in models with variable population. Suppose that the population is expanded,
but the total endowment is unchanged. Population Monotonicity demands that the bur-
den imposed on the existing population by the presence of the additional individuals is
shared by all of its members; no-one who is present before the population expansion is
better oﬀ as a consequence of the population augmentation.
If there is only one divisible good, each economy E = (R,Ω) deﬁnes an allotment
problem, as in the preceding section. When all preference proﬁles are single-peaked,
the uniform solution simply applies the uniform rule for the allotment problem to each
economy in the domain. In addition to the characterization of this solution presented
in the preceding section, there have been axiomatizations of the uniform solution us-
ing No Envy, Consistency, and variants of either Resource Monotonicity or Population
Montonicity, among other axioms. See Thomson (2006).
If some of the goods to be allocated are indivisible, much of the theory developed in the
context of perfectly divisible goods still applies. Due to the speciﬁc nature of the problem
of allocating indivisible objects, some interesting additional results can be obtained. As
an illustration, consider an assignment problem in which n indivisible objects are to be
allocated to n individuals and there is also a perfectly divisible good (“money”) that can
be consumed in any amount, positive or negative. See Thomson (2006) for references to
contributions that permit the number of goods and individuals to diﬀer. A commodity
bundle for person i is now a pair (ti, j) ∈ R × N , where ti (resp. j) is the amount of
money (resp. object) allocated to i. It is assumed that i’s preference Ri on R × N is
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strictly monotonic in money and that money can be used to compensate for the receipt
of a less desirable good in the sense that, for all ti ∈ R and all j, k ∈ N , there exists
si ∈ R such that i is indiﬀerent between (si, k) and (ti, j). An economy now consists of
a preference proﬁle R with the properties introduced above, an aggregate endowment of
money T ∈ R, and the n indivisible objects. Because the the set of objects is ﬁxed, an
economy can be characterized by a pair E = (R, T ). A feasible allocation for E is a pair
(t, ρ), where t ∈ Rn is a vector of balanced monetary allocations (i.e., ∑ni=1 ti = T ) and
ρ:N → N is a permutation with ρ(i) specifying the object allocated to person i.
Solutions and the Eﬃciency and No Envy axioms are deﬁned in the usual manner.
If the monetary allocations are restricted to be non-negative, it is clear that solutions
satisfying No Envy may not exist. For example, if T = 0 and everyone regards the same
object as being uniquely best regardless of the amount of money received, whoever is
allocated this object is envied by everyone else because no monetary compensations are
possible. Suﬃcient conditions for the existence of solutions satisfying No Envy with non-
negative monetary allocations are discussed in Thomson (2006). As is to be expected,
these conditions ensure that there is a suﬃcient amount of money available to carry out
the requisite compensation payments.
In the case of perfectly divisible goods, we have noted that the Equal-Division Wal-
rasian solution ϕW satisﬁes Eﬃciency and No Envy. Interestingly, in the indivisible-good
model considered here, the allocations generated by an adaptation of this Walrasian solu-
tion to the present framework are the only allocations satisfying No Envy (see Svensson,
1983). Moreover, Eﬃciency follows as a consequence of No Envy. In this model, for an
economy E, if everyone is provided with the same endowment t0 ∈ R+ of money, a Wal-
rasian equilibrium is a feasible allocation (t, ρ) and a price pk ∈ R+ for each good k ∈ N
such that the bundle (ti, ρ(i)) is weakly preferred by individual i among all bundles that
have values no more than t0. The solution ϕ
W is then deﬁned by letting ϕW(E) be the
set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations that can be obtained in this way.
A number of fairness principles besides No Envy have been considered in the literature.
See Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) and Thomson (2006). Particularly notable among
them is Egalitarian Equivalence, which is due to Pazner and Schmeidler (1978). In the
canonical allocation problem, Egalitarian Equivalence requires that, for each economy
E = (R,Ω), each selected allocation x has the property that there exists a consumption
bundle z0 ∈ Rm+ that everyone is indiﬀerent to. Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) have
shown that on the domain of economies E for this problem, solutions exist that satisfy
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both Egalitarian Equivalence and Pareto Optimality. However, Egalitarian Equivalence
need not satisfy Independence of Infeasible Alternatives, as the egalitarian allocation
(z0, . . . , z0) associated with x need not be feasible.
There is now an extensive literature that employs the framework and many of the
axioms described in this section to re-examine the foundations of egalitarian theories. If
individuals are held responsible in part for the outcomes they receive, conditional versions
of egalitarianism demand that individual diﬀerences caused by factors beyond the indi-
viduals’ control should be compensated for, whereas inequities that can be attributed
to choices for which an individual is responsible do not attract that kind of equaliza-
tion. Variants of this theory have been advocated by, for example, Roemer (1993). See
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) for a detailed survey of this literature.
6. Concluding remarks
As noted above, the response of Sen (1974) to Arrovian social welfare function impossi-
bilities was to abandon the ordinal noncomparability of individual utilities built into the
Arrow framework. However, he maintained the spirit of IIA by assuming that the social
ranking of any two alternatives should only depend on the individual utilities obtained
with them. This independence assumption is the cornerstone of the welfarist approach
employed in the literatures on social choice with interpersonal utility comparisons and
on variable-population social choice.
A diﬀerent resolution of the Arrovian dilemma has been described and defended
in Fleurbaey (2002). Rather than abandoning ordinal noncomparability, Arrow’s IIA
assumption is relaxed so as (i) to allow the social ranking of a pair of alternatives to
depend on how these alternatives are ranked relative to some other alternatives and (ii)
to incorporate some principle of fairness. This proposal has been explored in a series of
articles by Fleurbaey and various co-authors. For example, Fleurbaey, Suzumura, and
Tadenuma (2005) have shown that when the alternatives are the set of all allocations of
m ≥ 2 divisible private goods and the domain of the social welfare function is the set
of proﬁles of classical private-goods preferences, then Weak Pareto and a private-goods
version of Anonymity are compatible with an independence condition that incorporates
fairness considerations of the sort embodied in Egalitarian Equivalence. Independence
conditions such as this or ones based on envy-freeness employ non-local information
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about preferences, including information about alternatives that may not be feasible if
resource constraints are taken into account. If a social welfare function that satisﬁes
one of these fairness-based independence conditions is used to choose alternatives out of
diﬀerent agendas, Independence of Infeasible Alternatives will be violated. No consensus
has yet emerged as to whether the beneﬁts of the ordinal fairness-based approach to
social choice theory are suﬃcient to overcome objections that it is based on comparisons
that may involve non-feasible alternatives.
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